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A PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT;
A CRITIQUE AND AN ALTERNATIVE
(Copyright 1951-Author)
By
ROBERT B. ELY, III*

Introduction
Charged with a duty to "initiate studies and make recommendations for the
purpose of .

.

. encouraging the progressive development of international law

and its codification," ' the General Assembly of the United Nations has thus far
been active in its efforts to meet this responsibility. Some of its most significant
endeavors along these lines have been in the field of international criminal law.
In view of the participation therein by representatives of the United States, and
the degree to which the attitude of this country will affect these and related endeavors, the American Bar should know what has thus far been done, and should
express its views with regard to the future policy of our government.
Early in its history the General Ass'embly created the International Law
Commission 2 as a body of experts to assist it in the field under discussion; and a
year later the assembly adopted a statute setting out the commission's terms of reference. 8 Manley 0. Hudson of the United States 4 was elected in 1948 as its chairman
and has since acted in this capacity.
Two years previously the assembly had declared 5 that "genocide" was a crime
under international law. In December of 1948 it had received from its Iegal
committee a "Draft Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide," in Article VI of which it was provided that:
"Persons charged with genocide or [conspiracy in, incitement to,
attempts to commit, or complicity in the same] shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such internationalpenal tribunalas may have jurisdiction with
respect to those contracting parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction." (Italics supplied.) 6
This draft was adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948, and
signed the following day on behalf of the United States. 7 (It has since been trans*B.S., Princeton, 1928; LL.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1931; formerly deputy receiver in
Pennsylvania Department of Banking; assistant counsel, Insurance Company of North America;
member of Philadelphia and American Bar Associations.
I Charter of the United Nations, Art. 13.1(a).
2 See Sohn "The Development of International Law," 34 A.B.A.J. 53 (1948).
8 ibid.
4 Former judge of the League of Nations' Permanent Court of International Justice and of the
United Nations' International Court of Justice. See 34 A.B.A.J. 1149 (1948).
5 By Resolution 96(1) of December 11, 1946.
6 For full text of the Convention, see 35 A.B.A.J. Journal 52 (1949).
7 Gross, "General Assembly Adopts Convention on Genocide," 19 Dep't, State Bull. 755 (1948).
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mitted by the President to the Senate with favorable recommendations, 8 but has
not yet been ratified).
Immediately prior to approving this draft convention, the General Assembly 9
had invited the International Law Commission "to study the desirability and
possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons
charged with genocide or other crimes ... [paying] attention to the possibility
of establishing a Criminal Chamber of the International Court of Justice." In
Part IV of the report of its second session 10 the International Law Commission
indicated its conclusions that the establishment of such an international judicial
organ was both desirable and possible, but that it did not recommend the establishing of the suggested chamber of the I.C.J.
Shortly thereafter, 1 ' the assembly, after reciting the above facts, and expressing the opinion that further decisions could not be reached except on the
basis of concrete proposals, appointed a committee of seventeen members of the
United Nations' 2 "for the purpose of preparing one or more preliminary draft
conventions and proposals relating to the establishment and the statute of an international criminal court." This committee met in Geneva throughout August,
1951, under the chairmanship of George Maurice Morris, former president of the
American Bar Association, and produced a draft statute and a report' 8 which it
is the purpose of this paper to analyze and discuss:
The Proposed Statute for an International Criminal Court
The draft statute, consisting of 55 articles, is divided into seven chapters,
dealing in order with: General Principles; Organization; Competence; Committing
Authority and Prosecuting Attorney; Procedure; Clemency; and Final Provisions.
In Chapter I (General Principles) it is to be noted that there is established
a single,14 permanent'5 International Criminal Court to apply international and,
where appropriate,national law'6 in the trial of "persons accused of crines under
8 See report of "Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United
States Senate, on the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide," Government Printing Office, 1950. Further developments are outlined in the reports of the American Bar Association Special Committee on Peace and Law through the United
Nations dated September 1, 1949, September 1, 1950 and September 1, 1951.
9 By Resolution 260B(III) of December 9, 1948, recited in the report mentioned in n. 10, infra.

For text see 45 Am.J.Int.L. 134 et. seq. (January, 1951).
11 By Resolution 489(V) of December 12, 1950, recited in the Report of the Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction on the session held August 1-31, 1951, General Assembly of
the United Nations Document A/AC.48/4, 5 September, 1951 (hereafter cited as "C.I.C.J. Re.
port"). See "Development of International Law," 37 A.B.A.J. 932 (December, 1951).
12 i.e. the committee mentioned in n. 11, supra, composed of Australia, Brazil, China, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Israel, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Syria, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America and Uraguay.
10

18 Cited in n. 11, supra.

14 Resolution 489(V) of the General Assembly, n. 11, supra, referred to "an international judicial organ."
15 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (included in the report cited in n. 11,
supra, and hereafter cited simply as "draft statute"), Art. 3; "The court shall be a permanent body."
16 Draft statute, Art. 2.
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international law, as may be provided in conventions or special agreements among
states (which are) parties to the present statute."' 1 The court is to sit "only when
matters before it require attention."' I s
Chapter II (Organization of the Court) follows a pattern made familiar,
with one notable exception, by the statutes of the League of Nations' PermanLnt
Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) and the current International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.) in dealing with: the qualification, 19 number 2 0 and nationality of
judges; 2 ' their nomination,2 2 election, 28 terms, 24 oaths of office, 25 privileges and
immunities, 2 6 occupations27 and disability; 28 their disqualification, 2 9 dismissal"

17

Draft statute, Art. 1.

18 Draft statute, Art. 3. C.I.C.J. Report,

25: .

This did not mean that [the court] should

be in permanent session; the permanence should be understood in the sense of organic, not of
functional, permanence. . . .There might be long periods in which the court would have no cases
to consider."
19 Draft statute, Art. 4: ......
high moral character. . .[qualified by national standards for]
highest judicial office. . . .recognized competence" This is a verbatim copy of Art. 2 of the Statute
of the I.C.J.
20 Draft statute, Art. 5. The number is nine.
21 Draft statute, Art. 6, provides the same rule as does I.C.J. Statute, Art. 3, for determining
which nationality shall govern in the case of persons with multiple nationality. Both articles provide that no two judges may be nationals of the same state. The draft statute, alone, recognizes
that a judge may be a person without nationality.
22 Art. 7 of the draft statute provides for nominations by "the states parties to the.
statute," while Art. 4 of the Statute of the I.C.J. provided for nomination by "the national groups
in the Permanent Court of Arbitration." In both the draft statute (Art. 8 and 9) and in the
Statute of the I.C.J. (Art. 5 and 7) the Secretary General of the United Nations is to invite nominations and prepare a list of nominees.
23 In the draft statute, Art. 11, it is provided that the judges shall be elected at meetings of
the state parties to the statute, convened by the Secretary General; whereas under Art. 8 to 12
of the Statute of the I.C.J., the judges are elected by the General Assembly and the Security Council, acting independently of one, another.
24 Under both Art. 12 of the draft statute and the Statute of the I.C.J., Article 13, the term of
a judge is normally nine years, with a possibility of reelection, and a staggering of terms of the
initial members.
25 Art. 13 of the draft statute and Art. 20 of the Statute of the I.C.J. are verbatim copies of
each other in their substantive portions.
26 There is a similar identity in the provisions of Art, 14 of the draft statute and Art. 19 of the
Statute of the I. C. J.
27 The provision of Art. 15 of the draft statute, barring only occupations which might interfere
with the judge's judicial function during session of the court, or incompatible with his function
as a judge, is less stringent than the prohibition in Art. 16 of the Statute of the I.C.J.
28 Both Art. 16 of the draft statute and the Statute of the I.C.J., Art. 17.2 prohibit a judge
from participating in any case in which he has previously taken part in any other capacity.
20 Art. 17 of the draft statute makes a provision (not found in the corresponding Art. 24 of
the Statute of the I.C.J.) for motion by a party to disqualify a judge.
80 Art. 18 of the draft statute is substantially identical with the corresponding and similarly nimbered article of the Statute of the I.C.J., providing for dismissal only on the unanimous ecision
of the other members of the court, that a particular judge is no longer qualified.
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and resultant vacancies; 31 the officers,3 2 seat (unspecified) ,83 pay34 and finances8
of the court. Although the proposed court, like those of the League and of U. N., is
designed to act alone in its field, and hence is to be considered a "world court"
in this sense; its judges are not to be nominated and elected by general action of
37
the "world organization" (as were the judges of the P.C.I.J.86 and the I.C.J.)
but by only those states which adhere to the proposed statute, with the administra-

tive assistance of the Secretary of the United Nations. 88 In common with the P.C.I.J.
and the I.C.J. the proposed court is given power to adopt "rules for carrying out
its functions" and in particular "rules of procedure."

89

Chapter III (Competence of the Court) is of particular interest. Under its
provisions the court shall be competent to judge "natural persons only," including
ex-heads or ex-agents of government 40 upon whom may be imposed "such penalty
as the court may determine, subject to any limitation prescribed in the instrument
conferring jurisdiction upon the court."'4 1 However, there is no express provision

in the statute for enforcement of these penalties. The court may "request national
authority to assist it," but "a state shall be obliged to render such assistance only
[as it may have bound itself to do so] ."42
"No person shall be tried before the court unless jurisdiction has been conferred . . . by the state or states of which he is a national and . . . in which the
crime is alleged to have been committed."' 4 This jurisdiction may be conferred

by general convention, by special agreement as to a particular case, or by unilateral
declaration. 4 4 But in each such
General Assembly of the United
Access to the court is limited
organizations of states authorized

instance approval must be obtained from the
Nations. 45
to the General Assembly of the United Nations,
by it, and states which have conferred upon the

81 Art. 19 of the draft statute provides, as does Art. 14 of the Statute of the I.C.J., for vacancies
to be filled in the same method as laid down for the first election.
32 Draft statute, Art. 20, and Statute, of the I.C.J., Article 21, both provide for a president, a
vice president, a registrar, and "such other officers as may be necessary."
33 As is indicated, Art. 21 of the draft statute leaves the location of the seat of the court unnamed;
but gives the court the privilege of sitting wherever necessary. This last privilege also was given
the I.C.J. by Art. 22 of its statute.
84 Art. 22, draft statute, provides for travel expenses and daily pay during sessions, in addition
to an "annual remuneration," in contrast with only the annual salaries provided in Art. 32 of the
Statute of the I.C.J.
85 Art. 23, draft statute, provides for the expenses of the court to be paid out of a fund created,
maintained, collected and administered by the parties; whereas Art. 33 of the Statute of the I.C.J.
provided for these expenses to be borne by the United Nations.
86 Compare Art. 8-12 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice with Art. 11
of the draft statute, n. 23, rupra.
37 Compare Art. 8-12 of the Statute of the I.C.J. with Art. 11 of the draft statute, n. 23, supra.
38 In issuing invitations to nominate and preparing the list of nominees, draft statute, Art. 8 and 9.
39 Draft statute, Art. 24; Statute of the I.C.J., Art. 30.
40 Draft statute, Art. 25.
41 Draft statute, Art. 32.
42 Draft statute, Art. 31.
43 Draft statute, Art. 27
44 Draft statute, Art. 26.
45 Draft statute, Art. 28.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

VOL. 57

court jurisdiction over such offenses as are involved in the proceedings for which access is sought. 46 Note that whereas approval of the assembly is required before jurisdiction is conferred (which may be done for a whole class of cases), no such
approval is thereafter required for access as complainant. Jurisdiction may be
challenged not only by the parties to the proceeding, but also by any of the states
of or in which either the accused is a national or the crime is alleged to have been
committed. 47
Chapter IV (Committing Authority and Prosecuting Authority) is in two
parts. In the first, provision is made for the establishment "within the framework
of the United Nations" of a "Committing Authority." The -number, manner of
election, terms of office and qualifications of whose members shall be the same
as those of the judges of the court. 48 Its function shall be to examine the proofs
offered by the complainant through an agent designated for that purpose, and,
after giving the accused a reasonable opportunity to be heard, to certify the sufficiency of the evidence when it so finds. 49
In the second part of this chapter, 50 provision is made for a panel of ten
persons chosen at the same time and in the same manner as judges of the court,
and similarly qualified, from which are to be chosen the prosecutors of each particular case. Their duties shall be to prepare an indictment based on the findings
of the Committing Authority and to conduct the prosecution.
Chapter V (Procedure) deals in turn with: the form of indictment; 5' notice
thereof to the accused and state(s) concerned; 52 trial without jury; 8 rights of the
accused 54 (to be present, to conduct his defense in person or by counsel, to charge
his expenses against funds of the court where unable to meet them, to have the
proceedings translated into his own language, to interrogate witnesses and inspect
evidence, to produce evidence in defense, to have the court's assistance in obtaining same, and to be heard or refuse without prejudice to speak); public hearings
but private deliberations; 5 5 warrants of arrest;55. provisional liberty of accused;57
powers of court;58 dismissal; 59 nol. pros.i 6 0 quorum, majority, judgment and opin46 Draft statute, Art. 29.
47 Draft statute, Art. 30.
48 Draft statute, Art. 31.1.
49 Draft statute, Art. 33.2-33.5.
50 Draft statute, Art. 34.
61 Draft statute, Art. 35.
52 Draft statute, Art. 36, i.e. the state of which the accused is a national, and that in which the
crime is alleged to have been committed.
58 Draft statute, Art. 37.

54 Draft statute, Art. 38.
55 Draft statute, Art. 39.
56 Draft statute, Art. 40.
57 Draft statute, Art. 41, i.e. bail.
58 Draft statute, Art. 42, i.e. control of witnesses and evidence, and maintenance of order at trials.
59 Whenever "the court is satisfied that no fair trial can be had." Draft statute, Art. 43.
60 Called in Art' 44 of the draft statute "Withdrawal of Prosecution," which must be on approval

of the Court.
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ion of the court;61 appeals, subsequent trial, revision and execution of judgment.62
Chapter VI (Clemency) provides for a board of five members (whose qualifications are not specified) with "powers of pardon and parole and of ...alteration
of a sentence of the court. ' '6 8 It shall adopt its own rules of procedure. 64
Chapter VII (Final Provisions) provides merely that adherence to the statute
shall not prejudice the right of any two or more states to "set up special tribunss
to try the perpetrators of crimes over which each of such states has jurisdiction
according to the general rules of international law." 6 5 It is noteworthy that there
are no provisions regarding ratification, entry into force, amendment or denunation. In this respect the committee reported that it did not consider it essential to
the performance of its task, to make proposals regarding these matters, which could
"be added to the statute at a later stage of its elaboration.' '66
In a separate annex to its report the committee expressed the voeu that along
with the statute "a protocol shall be drawn up conferring jurisdiction on [the]
court in respect of the crime of genocide."
The Difficulties in the Proposal
It is dear at the outset that the proposal is subject, from the American viewpoint, at least to all of the objections which have thus far been raised against
the Declaration of Human Rights, 67 the Covenant thereon,6 8 and the Genocide
Convention.69 These objections center about the belief (which in the writer's
opinion is correct) that the adoption of these proposals would involve abrupt
surrenders of national sovereignty and violent dislocations of established national
legal procedures, out of proportion to the slight impetus which could be expected
to be given to "the progressive development of international law."
These general objections are made specific by reference to certain provisions
of the Constitution of the United States. A full consideration of them would extend
this discussion beyond reasonable bounds. However, a brief outline will suffice to
suggest the directions in which research must go, if more satisfactory alternatives
are to be discovered.
In Article 3 of the Constitution we find that "the judicial power [of the
United States] shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under ...
treaties; to controversies to which thL United States shall be a party; to controversies. ....
between citizens. . . .[of any state] and foreign states," 70 and that
61 Draft statute, Art. 45 to 49.
62 Draft statute, Art. 50 to 53.
68 Draft statute, Art. 54.1 and 54.2.
64 Draft statute, Art. 54.3.
65 Draft statute, Art. 55.

66 C.I.C.J. Report,
167.
67 Text is found in 35 A.B.A.J. 32 (1949). For discussions thereof, see n.- 78, infra.
68 Text is found in 36 A.B.A.J. 577 (1950). For discussions thereof, see n. 78, infra.
69 N. 6, supra. For discussions thereof see n. 78, infra.
70 § 2, clause 1.
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"the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and eshave power. . . .to
tablish." 71 Again in Article 1 we read that "Congress shall
72
nations."
of
law
the
against
offenses
....
define and punish
In the draft statute it is provided in Article 1 that "there is established an
International Criminal Court to try persons accused of crimes under internationa:.
law, as may be provided in conventions or agreements among parties to the present statute." In shifting from the philosophy of the Constitution to that of the
draft statute, one would transfer from the whole Congress to the President and
Senate the power to define crimes against international law, and from the federal
courts to the proposed tribunal the powers to try defendants accused of committing such crimes in the United States, whether upon complaint of the United
States or of foreign countries. This is surely a radical departure from our present
concepts of governmental power and of national sovereignty.
A lesser phase of the same difficulty is found when one compares Article
1, of the draft statute, recited above, with the provisions of Article I, Section 8,
Clause 10 of the Constitution which provides that eCongress shall have power....
to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over [the District of
Columbia] ." Here, again, adoption of the statute would mean transferring power
from the whole Congress to the President and Senate.
Even more numerous and equally serious conflicts are to be noted between
the provisions of our Constitution dealing with the rights of accused persons
and with criminal procedure, on the one hand, and those of the draft statute,
on the other. Taking them in the order in which they are written in the Constitution, we find:
Constitution, Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2, "The privilege of the
Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of
rebellion or invasion the public safety [of the United States] may require it." (Insertion and emphasis supplied.) The Draft Statute makes
no provision for such a writ and has only a sketchy article (mentioned
below) on the subject of "Provisional Liberty of Accused."
Constitution,Article 3, Section 2, Clause 3, "The trial of all crimes,
Draft Statute,
except incases of impeachment shall be by jury ....
Article XXXVII, "Trials shall be without a jury."
Constitution, idem, "Such trial shall be held in the state where the
said crimes shall have been committed, but when not committed with
in any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress
may by law have directed." Draft statute, Article XXI, "The court may
....
sit and exercise its functions elsewhere [than at its unspecified seat]
whenever the court considers it desirable."

71

§

1.

72 § 8, clause 10.
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No warrants shall issue, but
Constitution, Amendment 4, "....8
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized" (emphasis supplied). Draft statute, Article XL, "The court shall
have power to issue warrants of arrest related to crimes over which the
court has juridiction."
Constitution, Amendment 5, "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger." Draft statute, Article XXXIII, "There shall be established
within the framework of the United Nations a Committing Authority....
to examine the evidence offered by the complainant to support the complaint .... the authority shall give the accused reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to adduce such evidence as he may desire .... The authority
shall adopt its own rules of procedure."
Constitution, idem, "Nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of Iife or limb." Draft statute, Article 51, "No person who has been tried and acquitted or convicted before the court shall be subsequently tried for the same offense in any
court within the jurisdiction of any state which has conferred jurisdiction
upon the court with respect to such offense." (Emphasis supplied.)
Quaere how far this is effectively supplemented by Article L, "The judgment [of the proposed court] shall be final." (Emphasis supplied.)
Constitution, idem, "Nor shall [the accused] be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.
... Draft statute, Article XXXVIII, paragraph3, "The accused shall have the right to be heard
by the court but shall not be compelled to speak. His refusal to speak shall
not be relevant to the determination of his guilt. Should he elect to
speak, he shall be liable to questioning by the court and by counsel."
Constitution, idem, "Nor [shall the accused] be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." (Emphasis supplied.)
Draft statute, Article XXXVIII, paragraph 2, "The accused shall have
a fair trial . . ."
Constitution, Amendment 6, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the state and istrict wherein the crime shall have been committed.
The draft statute makes no provisions for speedy trial and,
as mentioned above, bars a jury. In Article XXXIX we find, "The
court shall sit in public unless there are exceptional circumstances in
which the court finds that public sittings might prejudice the interests'
of justice."
Constitution, idem, "[The accused shall enjoy the right] to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." Draft statute, Articles XXXV and XXXVI, "The indictment shall contain a concise statement of the facts which constitute each alleged offense and a specific
reference to the law under which the accused is charged .... The court
78 The quoted portion follows an opening provision as to security from "unreasonable searches

and seizures."
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shall bring the indictment to the notice of the accused .... The court shall
not proceed with the trial unless satisfied that the accused has had the
indictment or any amendment thereof, as the casue may be, served upon
him and has had sufficient time to prepare his defense."
Constitution, idem, ".... [The accused shall enjoy the right] to b-e
confronted with the witness against him [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor...." Draft statute, Article
XXXVIII, paragraph2, " [The accused shall have] the right to be present at all stages of the proceedings; ....

the right to interrogate, in per-

son or by his counsel, any witness and to inspect any document or other
evidence introduced during the trial;. . . .the right, to adduce oral and
other evidence in his defense; .... the right to the assistance of the court

in obtaining access to material which the court is satisfied may be relevant to the issues before the court." However, while it is further provided in Article XLll that "the court shall have the powers necessary to the
proper conduct of the trial, including the power to require the attendance of witnesses, require production of documents and other evidentiary material," and in Article XXXI, paragraph1, that "the court may
request national authorities to assist it in the performance of its duties,'
still it is provided in the second paragraph of the latter article that "a
state shall be obliged to render such assistance only in conformity with
convention or other instrument in which the state has accepted such obligation." (Emphasis supplied.)
Constitution, idem, " [The accused shall enjoy the right] to have
the assistance of counsel for his defense." Draftstatute, Article XXXVIII,
paragraph 2(b), "[The accused shall have] the right to conduct his
own defense or to be defended by counsel of his own choice, and to have
his counsel present at all stages of the proceedings."
Constitution, Amendment 8, "Excessive bail shall not be required."
Draft statute, Article XLI, "The court shall decide whether the accused
shall remain in custody during the trial or be provisionally set at liberty,
and the conditions under which such provisional liberty shall be granted."
Constitution, idem, "Nor [shall] excessive fines [be] imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." Draft statute, Article
XXXII, "The court shall impose upon an accused, upon conviction,
such penalty as the court may determine, subject to any limitations prescribed in the instrument conferring jurisdiction upon the court.",
As the foregoing comparison shows, no portion of the draft statute contains a verbatim copy of the corresponding portion of the Constitution. Only in
the case of the accused's right to counsel is there an approach to substantive equivalence. In the case of the right to jury trial there is flat contradiction. 'In the remaining instances, there are varying degrees of similarity and difference." 4 In
sum, the provisions of the draft statute represent a pronounced departure from
those of our Constitution.
74 This follows from the declared intentions of the Committee on International Criminal Juris-

diction, stated in
133 of its report, to "avoid terms which have a precise meaning and established implications in the legal language of one country, but not an equally precise meaning in
other countries."
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There is a school of legal thought to the effect that the treaty-making power
of the President and Senate 75 is so broad that they might legally commit this country to the draft statute as written, regardless of the provisions of the Constitution
recited above. On the other hand, it has been argued 76 that the treaty-making
power cannot be construed thus broadly and that the provisions of the Constitution would prevail with regard, at least, to crimes alleged to have been committed within the territory of the United States. There is no conclusive judicial
7
decision on the point. "
The fear that the treaty-making power may be properly given the broader
construction and that it might be used to abridge our national sovereignty and
to alter radically our scheme of government has ben the basis of most of the objections stated against the Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant thereon,
and the Genocide Convention.7 8 Such fears are equally justified, and such objections might equally well be made against the Proposed Statute for an International Criminal Court.
Perhaps these difficulties would seem less insurmountable if there were
reasons to believe that the establishment of international criminal courts would
give some real impetus to "the progressive development of international law"either by effectively enforcing observance of international law, or by fostering
75 U.S. Constitution, Art. 2, § 2, Clause 1 "[The President) shall have power, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators oresent concur."
76 Ely, "The Constitutionality of International Courts," 36 A.B.A.J. 738 (September, 1950), and
authorities cited.
77 See comments of Rifkind, J. in Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338, 339 (1944).
78 Generally see Holman, "Treaty Law-Making-A Blank Check for Writing a New Constitution, 36 A.B.A.J. 707 (1950); Ober, "The Treaty-Making and Amending Powers: Do They Protect Our Fundamental Rights?", 36 A.B.A.J. 715 (1950).
For discussion of the subject of human rights, see Ho!man, "An International Bill of Rights,"
34 A.B.A.T. 984 (1948); Lockwood, "Draft of International Covenant and Declaration on Human
Rights," 42 Am.J.Int.L. 401 (1948) ; "International Covenant: House Urges Study of Constitutional Questions," 35 A.B.A.J. 195 (1949); Moskowitz, "Is the U.N.'s Bill of Human Rights
Dangerous?", 35 A.B.A.J. 283 (1949); President Holman's comments, 35 A.B.A.J. 288, 360
(1949); " 'Universal Human Rights'....Current Discussions," 34 Mass.L.Q. 45 (1949); Kunz,
"United Nations Declaration of Human Rights," 43 Am.J.lnt.L. 316 (1949); Simsarian, "Action
on Human Rights," 35 A.B.A.J. 305 (1949); "Human Rights Draft Covenant Revised," 21
Dep't. State Bull. 3 (1949); Cohen "Debate on Human Rights," 21 Dep't. State Bull. 617, 659
(1949); Rix, "Human Rights and International Law: Effect of the Covenant on Our Constitution,"
35 A.B.A.J. 713 (1949); "International Human Rights-a Symposium," 14 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 411, 545 (1949); McDougal and Leight, "Rights of Man in a World Community," 59
Yale L. J. 60 (1949); Kelsen, "Charter Provisions on Human Rights in American Law," 44 Am.
T.Int.L. 543 (1950); Simsarian, "Draft International Convention on Human Rights....," 45 Am.
J.Int.L. 170 (1951); Turlington, "Human Rights Commission at the Crossroads," 45 Am.J.lnt.L.
534 (1951); Fleming, "The Dangers in the Covenant on Human Rights," 37 A.B.A.J. 737, 816
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the good will to support it. However, such benefits do not seem likely to result.
In contrast with civil courts (of which more will be said below) criminal
courts cannot function effectively without the support of police forces and executioners of their own. If the proposed court were set up and, as is suggested, if
it were obliged to rely on national forces for apprehension of the accused and
execution of sentence, the proposed court could not discharge its functions effectively except in the case of nonentities whose efforts were too obscure to be
of any public interest, and whose trial might well be left to national courts. In
cases of real importance, such as plots by national leaders to wage war or commit
genocide, the defendant's country would probably resist his arrest, trial and
sentence, and nothing short of the very occurrence sought to be avoided, i.e.
wvar, could compel his surrender.
However, there is this to be said (and herein seems to be the main merit
of the proposal): if a court such as the one proposed were established in advance of such a war, and were called into action when the war had been won,
there would then be less grounds for the cries of "victor's justice!" and "ex post
facto!" which have been raised in some quarters against the tribunals set up in
Germany and Japan after World War II. This, nevertheless, seems a slight advantage to balanfce against the dislocations of our legal system which would result from adherence to the draft statute.
Again, to view the other side of the coin, not only would the proposed court
have little chance, under existing circumstances, of being an efficient factor in
enforcing international law; it could not expect any greater success in securing
voluntary observance of international law. Again in contrast with civil courts,
criminal courts do not interpret and apply agreements to which the parties have
subscribed nor do they interpret and apply generally accepted rules to which
all parties, including the accused, are presumed to have agreed. The decision to
impose a sentence upon a criminal defendant is not reached by interpreting any
mutual agreement between the sovereign and the accused. A conviction is a decision that, under the given circumstances, the punitive force of the sovereign
shall be exercised against the accused.
Even if this were not the case, it seems likely that the proposed court (once
more in contrast to civil courts) would only act on rare occasions. 79 Consequentiy, its decisions would not be likely to be much of a factor in cultivating the habit
of either compulsory or voluntary abidance by international law.
The Significance of these Difficulties
The difficulties inherent in the fields of American constitutional theory,
79 In f 25 of the C.I.C.J. Report it is said: "There might be long periods in which the court
would have no cases to consider." It was, no doubt, for this reason that the Committee remarked,
in
55 of its report, that the "annual remuneration" provided in Art. 22 of the draft statute

should be "of a symbolic nature."
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mentioned above, have been widely discussed in connection with the Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant thereon and the Genocide Convention.8 0
Some members of the committee which drafted the proposed Statute for
an International Criminal Court had these objections, and the practical consideration last mentioned, both firmly in mind when they said in their report 8 ' that
the establishment of such a court "could not be recommended," since it "would
meet with insurmountable obstacles" and "would involve very real dangers to
th'e further development of international good feeling and cooperation." 82 Before proceeding with their task of draftsmanship, these members made certain
that "it was understood that no member would be debarred from expressing
his opinion as to the desirability of setting up such a court [nor]. . . .would
commit his government to any of the decisions which the committee might eventu88
ally adopt."
In the face of similar objections to the agreements with respect to human
rights and genocide the Senate has thus far withheld its advice and consent to
ratification of the Declaration, Covenant and Convention. It is not likely that
the proposed Statute for an International Court would meet a different fate.
It rather looks as though the United States were drifting, in this field, into
the same position, unfortunate both for this country and the rest of the world,
in which it stood with respect to the League of Nations. By their active participation in the discussions of major projects for the progressive development of
international law, one group of American representatives has inspired high hopes
for the realization of those projects, while another group of American representatives with final authority (and, perhaps, the greater wisdom) seems determined
to bar further participation by this country.
It is well known that the United States suffered a severe setback in its international leadership as a result of the rejection by the Senate of the proposals
which President Wilson had sponsored. A similar setback would be suffered
if this country were to flatly reject the current project for an international criminal judiciary, without offering any constructive alternative. It would, therefore,
seem vitally important to take all possible steps to avoid such an unfortunate
outcome. No stone should be left unturned in the further search for other, and
perhaps more acceptable, methods of strengthening the international judiciary.
An Outline of Alternatives
The activities of the General Assembly of the United Nations in the fields
of human rights, genocide and general international criminal jurisdiction have
been largely inspired by a clear and valid motive. An attempt has been made
to capitalize upon the dramatic values of the war crimes trials in Germany and
80 See n. 78, supra.
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83 Op. cit.,
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Japan, which have made a vivid impression on the public mind, the world over.
The draft statute for an International Criminal Court represents one effort to
formulate and implement the principles for which those trials are thought to
4
have stood.8
If one can deduce from the precedents of those trials only the single limited
proposition that "there are crimes under international law for which individuals
may be tried and punished, regardless of any defense which might exist under
their national law," then the draft statute under discussion is about all one can
devise by way of implementation for it. One can only provide a method by which
such crimes can be defined through international agreement, and a court to try
defendants accused of committing the crimes thus defined.
However, it would seem that no strain on logic is needed to deduce from the
same precedents two rather broader propositions:
First, that "international law exists apart from and superior to national law,"
and second, that "it is possible and desirable to establish international courts to
interpret and apply international law in litigation involving individuals." In
searching for implementation of these broader propositions, one finds a much
wider field of opportunities opened up.
True, one faces the same general problems of how to establish international
courts, and how to define the law which they are to apply. The answer to the first
question is as simple here as it was in the case of the proposed criminal court.
The tribunals can be established by agreement of like-thinking members of the
United Nations, 8 5 with either the recommendation or approval of the General
Assembly. 88 The answer to the question of what law shall be applied is already
given in the Statute of the International Court of Justice:
"The court ....
shall apply ....:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law;
87
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations."
84 For discussion of the principles deduced by the International Law Commission, and the debates thereon, see Liang, "Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations," 45 Am.J.
Int.L. 514, et seq. (1951).
85 Authorized by Art. 95 of the Charter of the United Nations, in Chapter XIV-"The International Court of Justice," which reads "Nothing in the present charter shall prevent members
of the United Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals [than
the International Court of Justice] by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be
concluded in the future."
86 The authority to "make recommendations for the purpose of...prorioting. . .the progressive
development of international law ....
." necessarily implies the right subsequently to approve
actions which it might initially have recommended. On this point note the comments in the C.I.C.J.
Report, ff 23:
"It was understood that such a convention might be concluded under the auspices of the
United Nations, and it was suggested that the General Assembly might elect to call a conference
for that purpose. Thereby, a desirable link between the court and the United Nations would be
established."
87 Statute of the I.C.J. Art. 38.
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When one gets to the more particular problems of procedure, one finds
that the thus far unexplored field of dvil jurisdiction presents considerably fewer difficulties (especially from the American viewpoint) than does the criminal
trial field, dealt with in the draft statute under discussion. None of the provisions in our Constitution, which, we have discussed above, dealing with the
rights of accused, present any difficulties if we treat only with civil jurisdiction.
The provisions dealing with procedure on the civil side present very slight obstacles.88
Again, one would be much less troubled by the definition of "the judicial
power of the United States" if -the jurisdiction of the international court was
limited to the intermediate appellate field (such as exercised by the Federal
Court of Appeals) with final review on certiorari by the Supreme Court of the
United States. There would seem to be no trouble at all in this respect, if an
international court were given purely advisory jurisdiction, as was done in the
case of the International Prize Court. 89
Moreover, international courts with jurisdiction over the civil litigation of
individuals would be much more likely to induce the habit of voluntary compliance with international law, than would their proposed counterpart in the criminal field.
In the first place, as has been said above, the adjudication of a civil dispute
represents a mutual adjustment of differences and a prescription of future conduct in the case, such that the rights of all parties will be protected. Each such
case, well decided, makes it more likely that future controversies will be voluntarily
submitted to the courts. On the other hand, successful criminal prosecutions have
been the opposite (though perhaps equally salutary) effect of inducing prospective criminals to stay out of court.
In the second place, the influence of international civil courts would not
only be better in quality in the sense just discussed, but greater in quantity. In
every jurisdiction the number of civil judgments far outweighs the number of
decisions in criminal cases. At the present time there already is a tremendous
volume of cases decided by national courts in which non-state parties have been
litigants, and in which questions of international law were involved.9 0 In view
88 In addition to the previously mentioned provision of Art. 1, § 8, Clause 17 giving the whole
Congress (rather than the President and Senate) legislative jurisdiction over the District of Columbia, there is only the final clause of Amend. V, providing that no person shall "be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
89 The United States adhered to the statute of this international tribunal after, but only, after,
A Protocole Additionnel had been added, under which the court was to review only the question

in controversy, without affecting the judgment of the national court. See Butts, "The Protocole
Additionnel," 6 Am.J.lnt.L. 799, 801 (1912).
55 of its 1950 report to the General
90 As was said by the International Law Commission in
Assembly (see 44 Am.J.Int.L. Supplement 117, October, 1950), "It would be a herculean task
to assemble the decisions, on questions of international law, of the national courts of all states."

DICKINSON LAW REVIEWV

VOL. 57

of the way in which the international relations of private individuals and organizations are increasing, both in number and in complexity, the volume of this
type of litigation is bound to grow. In order that it may have its proper effect
as a stimulus to "the progressive development of international law" is to remove from it the set of national trademarks it now bears, and to place on this
mass of past and future precedents the official stamp of approval by a duly constituted international judicial authority. 91
A Proposal
It would, therefore, seem highly advisable that the representatives of the
United States in the United Nations urge the General Assembly to "initiate studies and make recommendations as to the desirability and possibility of establishing
international courts with civil jurisdiction to decide questions arising between
non-state parties and involving questions of international law."
In the course of exploring these alternatives, proposals might be formulated
involving less renunciation of national sovereignty, less disturbance of established national legal traditions and procedure, and less objections under the Constitution of the United States than are implicit in the Proposed Statute for an
International Criminal Court; while at the same time, containing greater potentialities of stimulus to the "progressive development of international law."
If this were the case, then the United States, by accepting such proposals,
could preserve intact its present leadership in this field-a leadership which
would otherwise be noticeably impaired by the rejection (however, justified) of
the present proposal, without the offer of a constructive altemativl.
91 To quote Cardozo, J., in New Jersey v. Delaware, 54 S. Ct. 407, 291 U.S. 361, 78 L.Ed. 847
(1933), "International law...has at times, like the common law within states, a twilight existence
during which it is hardly distinguishable from morality or justice, till at length the imprimatur
of a court attests its jural quality."

